Modeling the impact of test anxiety and test familiarity on the criterion-related validity of cognitive ability tests by REEVE, Charlie L. et al.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of
Business Lee Kong Chian School of Business
1-2009
Modeling the impact of test anxiety and test
familiarity on the criterion-related validity of
cognitive ability tests
Charlie L. REEVE
University of North Carolina at Charlotte
Eric D. HEGGESTAD
University of North Carolina at Charlotte
Filip LIEVENS
Singapore Management University, filiplievens@smu.edu.sg
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intell.2008.05.003
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research
Part of the Industrial and Organizational Psychology Commons, and the Organizational
Behavior and Theory Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business by an authorized administrator
of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
REEVE, Charlie L.; HEGGESTAD, Eric D.; and LIEVENS, Filip. Modeling the impact of test anxiety and test familiarity on the
criterion-related validity of cognitive ability tests. (2009). Intelligence. 37, (1), 34-41. Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of
Business.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/5623
Modeling the impact of test anxiety and test familiarity on the
criterion-related validity of cognitive ability tests☆
Charlie L. Reeve a,⁎, Eric D. Heggestad a, Filip Lievens b
a University of North Carolina Charlotte, United States
b Ghent University, United States
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t
Article history:
Received 26 January 2007
Received in revised form 20 May 2008
Accepted 21 May 2008
Available online 7 July 2008
The assessment of cognitive abilities, whether it is for purposes of basic research or applied decision
making, is potentially susceptible to both facilitating and debilitating inﬂuences. However, relatively
little research has examined the degree to which these factors might moderate the criterion-related
validity of cognitive ability tests. To address this gap, we use Classical Test Theory formulas to
articulatehowtest anxietyand test familiaritycan inﬂuenceobserved scores, observedscorevariance,
andmost importantly, the criterion-related validity of observed scores. The resulting equations reveal
that understanding the inﬂuence of test anxiety and test familiarity on criterion-related validity
coefﬁcients requires the consideration of a number of additional parameters. To elucidate the
implications of the model, we present a Monte Carlo simulation. Results show that anxiety and
familiarity can have a signiﬁcant negative effect on the observed criterion-related validity, but also
show that this effect is highly variable. In particular, the effect depends heavily upon the relation
between these factors and the criterion variable. Additionally, we note that the equationswe develop
highlight important gaps in the literature; there are few clear empirical estimates of several of the
parameters in our formulas. We call for future research to better examine these additional relations.
© 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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The use of ability tests is common in both educational and
employment settings due to their robust capability to predict
importantoutcomes (Jensen,1998;Kuncel,Hezlett,&Ones, 2001;
Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). However, concomitant relations
between test scores and non-ability factors (e.g., affective traits,
socio-economic indicators) continue to fuel concerns that ability
test scores and/or associated predictive validity coefﬁcients may
be biased. In particular, substantial attention has been given to
examining the inﬂuence of test anxiety and test familiarity1 (aka,
test-speciﬁc knowledge, test sophistication). Although both test
anxiety and test familiarity are concepts with multiple dimen-
sions, it can generally be stated that test anxiety is negatively
related to ability test performance (Hembree, 1988; Zeidner,
1995), and test familiarity is positively, thoughweakly, related to
ability test performance (Anastasi, 1981; Kulik, Bangert-Drowns,
& Kulik, 1984). To the extent that test anxiety has a negative
inﬂuence on ability test performance, and to the extent that test
familiarity has a positive inﬂuence on performance, the use of
such tests in applied settingsmay result in thebiased assessment,
placement, or selection of test-takers. For example, in the context
of college admissions, high ability applicantswho suffer from test
anxiety may be inappropriately rejected while lower ability
applicants with high levels of test familiarity may be inappropri-
ately accepted.
Despite these concerns, little researchhas explicitlyexamined
how these non-target factors might impact the criterion-related
validity (CRV) of cognitive ability tests. Rather most of the extant
research has investigated the relationships between test perfor-
mance and test anxietyor test familiarity, or the impact of various
test preparation activities on ability test performance. Although
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1 For brevityof expression,weuse the term ‘test familiarity’ in a general sense to
encompass all construct-irrelevant test-speciﬁc “knowledge” that is not associated
with the actual ability being measured. Although we recognize there are
differences between concepts such as test-taking skills, test-wiseness, test famil-
iarity, and test-speciﬁc variance, all of these concepts do share a common theme.
Namely, all of these concepts reﬂect, in various forms, a performance-facilitating
factor that is theoretically independent of the ability measured by the test.
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these studies are valuable for understanding the nexus of
correlates of ability test performance, they do not by themselves
demonstrate whether and to what degree these factors (or
changes in these factors) artiﬁcially inﬂateordeﬂate theobserved
CRV coefﬁcients. Without direct empirical evidence, both
scholars and practitioners are without a clear understanding of
how such factors might result in ﬂawed estimates of CRV. This
lack of understanding is especially concerning for those who use
ability tests in selection contexts based on the assumption that
the CRV of test scores has been accurately established. If test
anxiety and test familiarity signiﬁcantly alter the CRV of ability
test scores, practitioners would need to be cognizant of and
consider ways to reduce differences in these factors.
Moreover, few contemporary studies of the effects of test
anxiety and test familiarity have formalized the conceptual
models in mathematical terms (see Jensen, 1998; te Nijenhuis,
vanVianen,& vander Flier, 2007, for exceptions).Webelieve that
the failure to formalize conceptual arguments in a clearly
articulated psychometric model explaining how test anxiety
and test familiarity affects observed scores, observed score
variance, and the CRV coefﬁcient is a notable omission in the
current literature. Typically, only arguments regarding the
conceptual processes that might lead to changes in performance
are provided, and correlationswith these non-ability factors and
testperformanceare reported.Unfortunately, theexaminationof
correlationswith observed scores alone does not provide insight
into how the inclusion of contaminating factors might inﬂuence
the CRV of the test scores.While empirical research is ultimately
required, it is possible to gain a better understanding of howand
towhat degree test anxiety and test familiaritymight impact the
CRV of ability assessments through the clear articulation of a
psychometric model. As such, we present a psychometric model
based on Classical Test Theory that directly incorporates these
twonon-ability factors (namely, test anxietyand test familiarity).
Following the articulation of that model, we present the results
of a Monte Carlo simulation to demonstrate the potential
implications of these two factors on CRV coefﬁcients.
1. A psychometric consideration
In the following sections we use Classical Test Theory to
elucidate how test anxiety and test familiarity inﬂuence
observed scores on cognitive ability tests, the variance in
those scores across a sample of test takers, and most
importantly, the CRV of those scores.
1.1. Classical Test Theory and Observed Variance in Ability Test
Scores
The central premise of classical test theory is that an
individual's observed score on a test can be expressed as:
X ¼ T þ E ð1Þ
where X is the observed score (i.e., the score the individual
obtains on the assessment), T is the true score, and E is error.
True score can be deﬁned as themean score for an individual if
he or she were to complete the assessment across a large
number of identical testing situations (i.e., under the same
testing conditions, in the same physical and psychological
state). Thus, assuming the test is construct valid, the true score
can be thought of as reﬂecting the individual's position on the
latent dimension(s) the testmeasures (note, true score contains
all systematic sources of variance and is thus not the same thing
as the concept of a latent variable or a construct; however, we
make the assumption that a large portion of the systematic
variance is due to the target construct). Error is deﬁned as the
deviation of any observed score from the true score. Error,
furthermore, is deﬁned to be a random, normally distributed
variable with a mean of zero; that is, across a large number of
theoretical testing occasions, an individual's distribution of
error scores would have a mean of zero. Extrapolating to a
population of test-takers, it would be expected that true and
error scores would be uncorrelated and that the mean of the
error scores in the populationwould also be zero. If Eq. (1) holds
for each individual in the sample, then the observed variance in
a sample can be said to be a function of the variance in true
scores and the variance in random errors:
σ2X ¼ σ2T þ σ2E ð2Þ
When assessing general cognitive ability, it is often assumed
that true score is synonymouswith standingon the ability (i.e.,g).
Such an assumption is not technically correct from the
perspective of classical test theory, however. That is, as noted
by Crocker and Algina (1986), “Any systematic errors or biasing
aspects of a particular test for an individual contribute to that
person's psychological true score on that test” (p.110). Thus, from
a technical standpoint, “true score” is deﬁned as a composite of
all systematic sources of variance. In the current context, the
assumption is that there is one random source of variance (i.e.,
random measurement error) and three systematic sources of
variance: the construct of interest (in this case, g), a construct-
irrelevant debilitating factor (i.e., test anxiety), and a construct-
irrelevant facilitating factor (i.e., test familiarity). Therefore, we
can re-specify Eq. (1) as follows:
X ¼ Tg þ TA þ TF
 þ E ð3Þ
where X is the observed score, Tg is the component of true score
due to g, TA is the component of true score due to test anxiety, TF
is the component of true score due to test familiarity and E is
random error variance. Accordingly, Eq. (2) can be re-expressed
as follows:
σ2X ¼ðσ2Tg þ σ2TA þ σ2TF þ 2σTgTA þ 2σTgTF þ 2σTgEX
þ2σTATF þ 2σTAEX þ 2σTFEX Þ þ σ2EX
ð4Þ
where σ2Tg is the true score variance due to g, σ
2
TA is the true score
variance due to test anxiety, σ2TF is the true score variance due to
test familiarity,σTgTA is the covariance of g and test anxiety,σTgTF is
the covariance of g and test familiarity, andσTATF is the covariance
of test anxiety and test familiarity. Of course, anycovariance term
with an error component (EX) equals zero by deﬁnition, thus Eq.
(4)2 can be simpliﬁed as:
σ2X ¼ σ2Tg þ σ2TA þ σ2TF þ 2σTgTA þ 2σTgTF þ 2σTATF
 
þ σ2EX ð5Þ
In comparing Eq. (5) to Eq. (2), we see that the variance in
observed scores is not just a function of individual differences
2 Please note that the derivation of Eq. (4) makes the simplifying
assumption that there are not any higher-order interactive effects among
the true scores. Thus, we include zero-order relations (i.e., covariances)
among these factors, butwedo notmodel two-wayor three-way interactions.
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in g, anxiety and test familiarity, but also of the degree to
which those factors covary.
1.2. The inﬂuence on criterion-related validity
To understand how test anxiety and test familiarity might
inﬂuence the CRV coefﬁcients of observed ability test scores,
we start with the standard expression of the correlation
between a predictor, X, and a criterion, Y:
rXY ¼ σXYﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
σ2X 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
σ2Y
qr ð6Þ
Next, we can replace various terms in Eq. (6) with the
equations derived above. First, in the numerator, we can
substitute X with the expression shown in Eq. (3) and Y with
the Classical Test Theory expression shown in Eq. (1) (except
here we are dealing with Y rather than X). Second, in the
denominator, we can substitute σX2 with the expression
shown in Eq. (5) and σY2 can be replaced with the Classical
Test Theory expression shown in Eq. (2). Thus, Eq. (6) can be
rewritten as:
rXY ¼
σ TgþTAþTFþEXð Þ TYþEYð Þﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
σ2Tg þ σ2TA þ σ2TF þ 2σTgTA þ 2σTgTF þ 2σTATF
 
þ σ2EX 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
σ2TY þ σ2EY
qr
ð7Þ
Expanding the numerator using basic algebra, we get the
following:
rXY ¼
σTgTY þ σTgEY þ σTATY þ σTAEY þ σTFTY þ σTFEY þ σEXTY þ σEXEYﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
σ2Tg þ σ2TA þ σ2TF þ 2σTgTA þ 2σTgTF þ 2σTATF
 
þ σ2EX 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
σ2TY þ σ2EY
qr
ð8Þ
Once again, the covariance terms in the numerator that
contain an error term are by deﬁnition equal to zero, thus we
can simplify the equation as:
rXY ¼
σTgTY þ σTATY þ σTFTYﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
σ2Tg þ σ2TA þ σ2TF þ 2σTgTA þ 2σTgTF þ 2σTATF
 
þ σ2EX 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
σ2TY þ σ2EY
qr
ð9Þ
Comparing Eq. (9) to Eq. (6), we see that there are seven
additional terms that impact the observed correlation with
two appearing in the numerator and ﬁve in the denomi-
nator. Accordingly, understanding how the non-ability
factors of test anxiety and test familiarity will impact the
observed correlation between observed ability test scores
and a criterion variable is more complex than typically
recognized.
1.3. Implications of Eq. (9)
As was noted above, a key concern for scientists and
practitioners alike is the possibility that test anxiety and test
familiarity may result in biased estimates of ability or validity.
To the extent test anxiety artiﬁcially reduces performance on
ability tests and test familiarity artiﬁcially increases perfor-
mance on ability tests, it is often believed that the use of such
tests in applied contexts may result in the biased evaluation of
test takers. We believe the equations presented here can help
inform the discussion on important theoretical questions
concerning these factors.
For example, Eq. (9) can be used to understand whether
and to what degree test anxiety might negatively impact on
the observed CRV of cognitive ability tests. Similarly, Eq. (9)
can be used to better understand the extent to which the
observed CRV of cognitive ability tests varies as a function of
test anxiety and test familiarity. Importantly, Eq. (9) shows
that it is not just the variance due to these factors that will
inﬂuence the observed CRV; rather there are several
additional elements to be considered. In this sense, we
believe Eq. (9) also has theoretical implications in that it
highlights the need to ask additional questions that are
rarely asked in the testing literature. For example, to what
extent does the relationship between test anxiety (or test
familiarity) and the criterion impact the observed CRV of
cognitive ability tests?
Additionally, the derivation of a psychometric model (i.e.,
Eq. (9)) allowed us to identify all the pieces of information
that are needed for a comprehensive understanding of how
and when non-ability factors might negatively impact the
use of ability test scores. Even a brief perusal of the literature
will reveal that there are key gaps in our knowledge which
prevent this comprehensive understanding. That is, there
does not appear to be much research on several of the
additional parameters shown in Eq. (9) (a point we will
make salient below). Thus, we believe the use of such
equations can have a meaningful contribution on ability
testing research.
2. A simulation study of the implications of Eq. (9) on CRV
The primary purpose of this paper is the articulation of a
psychometric model of the impact of anxiety and test
familiarity on CRV using Classical Test Theory. Eq. (9) is the
result of that effort. Above we suggested several ways that
Eq. (9) might have implications for important theoretical
and applied questions. To help elucidate some of these
implications, we present a brief Monte Carlo simulation to
show how the seven focal parameters in Eq. (9) inﬂuence
CRV coefﬁcients.
2.1. Constants
There are 12 parameters in Eq. (9). Five of these were
held constant for the current study. In particular, we set
the correlation between Tg and the criterion variable (Y) to
be rgY= .50. This value was chosen as a rough average of
estimated ρ between g and useful criteria ranging from
school grades, to job training, to job performance in
moderately complex jobs (see Jensen, 1998; Schmidt &
Hunter, 1998). In addition, the variance for g and the
observed criterion variable were based on standardized
scores (i.e., M=0, S.D. =1.0) and held constant across
different conditions. Finally, to focus on the effects of the
substantive variables, we set the two error variance terms
equal to zero (i.e., the effects of the substantive parameters
on the CRV can be directly interpreted without corrections
for unreliability).
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2.2. Variables3
Given the potentially extreme number of conditions
generated by crossing seven independent variables, we
restricted our simulation by having only two levels of each
variable. One value for all parameters was set to zero, as this
reﬂects an extremely conservative condition (i.e., no real
relation exists). Consistent with recommendations of Paxton,
Curran, Bollen, Kirby, and Chen (2001) to use realistic values in
Monte Carlo simulations, the comparison set of values was
based on the best plausible estimates found in the current
literature. Hence, we believe they provide reasonable estimates
for the purpose of demonstration. However, we again empha-
size that researchers should consider what the various para-
meters are likely to be in their speciﬁc situation. Conceivably a
wide varietyof values could have beenmodeled. The purpose of
this simulation is simply to demonstrate the potential impact of
these factors on obtained CRVs as indicated by the formulas
derived above, given a set of starting values. It should not be
interpreted as providing real estimates of rho for any given
situation. Additionally, please note that although the formulas
clearly are based onvariances and relations of true scores,many
of the estimates used in the simulation are drawn from prior
research on observed scores. Though psychometric meta-
analysis could provide such estimates in theory, such analyses
do not exist for most of the relations in the formulas.
2.2.1. g-test anxiety relationship (rga)
Ackerman and Heggestad (1997) reported a meta-analytic
correlation of r=− .33 between general intelligence tests and test
anxiety while Hembree (1988) reported a meta-analytic correla-
tion of r=− .23. Furthermore, Jensen (1998) reported the typical
g-saturation of the IQ score is at least .80 (p. 91). Thus, to gain
an estimate of the correlation between g and test anxiety we
multiplied − .28 (the average of themeta-analytic correlations) by
.64 (a conservative estimate of the proportion of variance due to
g). This results in an estimated value of rga=− .18. Thus, we used
that value, in addition to rga=0.0, for the simulation.
2.2.2. g-test familiarity relationship (rgf)
Evidence concerning the correlation between g and TF is
relative sparse. Nonetheless, we can make some reasonable
estimates. First, to the extent that individual differences in g
reﬂect the ability to learn and proﬁt from experience, it is
plausible that g and TF will become increasingly positively
correlated with increasing test experience. For example,
Kulik, Kulik, and Bangert (1984) found smaller practice effects
for a lower ability subgroup compared to medium or high
ability subgroups, suggesting that high ability individuals
beneﬁt more from a single practice test than lower ability
individuals (cf. te Nijenhuis et al., 2007). Meta-analytic results
also suggest a small positive correlation between these
variables. Hembree (1988) reported the effect of test-skills
training on actual test performance to be an r equivalent of
.13, and Ergene (2003) reported an r equivalent of .21. Please
note, we are not suggesting that practice effects are g-loaded
(see, Lievens, Reeve, & Heggestad, 2007; te Nijenhuis et al.,
2007). Rather, we are simply noting that g tends to be
correlated with learning outcomes in all domains, we thus
assume that in the context of test-skills training, gwould also
be related to skill/knowledge acquisition. Thus, if we assume
an average correlation of .17 between some form of method-
speciﬁc knowledge acquisition and test performance, the
estimated rgf would be .11 (i.e., .17 multiplied by .64, which is
the proportion of test variance due to g). Thus, for the
simulation, two possible values were chosen: rgf=0.0 and
rgf= .11.
2.2.3. Criterion-test anxiety relationship (rYa)
With respect to the relation between test anxiety and
criteria normally associated with ability test scores, we can
posit that it is likely to vary between zero and somemoderate
negative value. For example, empirical research clearly shows
that scores on measures of test anxiety (almost all of which
measure only the debilitating aspect of anxiety) do in fact
negatively correlate with performance outcomes. Hembree's
(1988) meta-analysis showed test anxiety had an estimated
ρ=− .29 with school grades, and found that the worry
component of test anxiety was negatively related to achieve-
ment test performance (estimated ρ=− .31). For non-test
criteria such as job performance, it is unclear whether there
would be any correlation. On the one hand, to the extent that
one's test anxiety is speciﬁc to standardized tests, we are
likely to see no relation to non-test criteria. On the other hand,
to the extent that test anxiety is simply a manifestation of a
more general anxiety trait (e.g., general anxiety, fear of
evaluation in general), we might expect to again see negative
correlations between test anxiety scores and scores on
evaluative criteria. Thus, the relation between test anxiety
and performance criteria likely varies between no relation
and some moderately negative value such as that shown in
Hembree's meta-analysis. As such, for the purpose of the
simulation we chose values of rYa=0.0 and rYa=− .29.
2.2.4. Criterion-test familiarity relationship (rYf)
There is little research on the relation between test familiarity
(with respect to the predictor test) and criterion performance.
Intuitively though, it is difﬁcult to imagine why familiarity with
the predictor test would enhance one's performance on the
variety of criteria predicted by ability tests. Even for a criterion
suchasGPA (whichwouldbebasedpartlyonexams), it is difﬁcult
to imagine a correlation much higher than r=.15. Our reasoning
here is based on the results of twometa-analyses examining the
effect of test-speciﬁc skills training on test performance;
Hembree (1988) reported an r equivalent of .13 whereas Ergene
(2003) reported an r equivalent of .21. These provide the best
existing estimates of the size of the correlation between training
for a speciﬁc test and subsequent performance on that test. It is
difﬁcult to imagine any reason why such test-speciﬁc training
would be more strongly related to any given criterion variable,
especially if it were not another test (e.g., supervisor ratings on a
job, teacher evaluations of written work). As such, we arbitrarily
chose a value of rYf=.15 as the upper value for the relation
between predictor-test-speciﬁc knowledge and any criteria. We
3 Foreaseof expression, the subscripts on the correlationshavebeen simpliﬁed
by dropping the true score (i.e., T) notation. These should not be confused with
the typical notation where the single subscripts would indicate observed
variables. To help identify the difference, we have used lowercase letters on the
subscripts of correlations. For example, “a” shouldbe readasTA. Thus, thenotation
raf, for example, reﬂects the correlation between anxiety true scores and test
familiarity true scores. For purpose of the simulation, the criterion, Y, is the
observed score. Thus, we use a capitalized Y in the subscripts throughout.
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believe this is a reasonable (in fact, likelya quite liberal) value as it
is slightly lower than the average estimate of the relation
between test-speciﬁc training and test performance. In most
cases, the correlation is likely to be null. Thus, the values chosen
were: rYf=0.0 and rYf=.15.
2.2.5. Test anxiety–test familiarity relationship (raf)
Both thedeﬁcitsmodel of test anxiety (e.g., Tobias,1985) and
the interference model of test anxiety (e.g., Wine, 1971) posit a
negative correlation between test anxiety and test familiarity.
The deﬁcits model posits that test anxiety decreases as one
acquires test-speciﬁc knowledge or otherwise increases his or
her readiness. The interference model suggests that anxiety
may decrease as the person becomes more accustomed to the
situation and is thus less distracted by unfamiliarity with the
testing situation. Consistent with these suggestions, Hembree
(1988) reported a mean effect size of − .54 for systematic
desensitization programs (i.e., repeatedly exposing a highly
anxious student to the test lead to a reduction in test anxiety).
Similarly, Hembree (1988) reported a signiﬁcant reduction in
test anxiety after participating in “test-wiseness” training
programs with an r equivalent of − .27. As a result, regardless
of which theory of test anxiety to which one subscribes, both
theory and empirical evidence suggest that TA is inversely
related to some form of test familiarity. Because we could not
ﬁnd any other reasonable estimates of this relationship, we
chose to use Hembree's r equivalent of − .27. Thus, two possible
values were chosen: raf=0.0 and raf=− .27.
2.2.6. Variance in test anxiety (σTA
2) and Variance in test
familiarity (σTF
2)
Deﬁning the speciﬁc amount of true score variance due to
anxiety or test familiarity was not possible from the existing
literature. Additionally, it is to be expected that the different
tests will have higher or lower g-saturations (i.e., more or less of
the observed score variance is due to g). Nonetheless, to provide
a simulation that reﬂects a realistic situation, we chose to
consider IQ scores. Based on Jensen's (1998) work, it can be
estimated that about 64% of thevariance in observed IQ scores is
due to ‘g.’As such, 36% of the variancewould be due to error and
other systematic (i.e., true score) factors. Thus, for a baseline
conditionwe set σg2=1.0, and the variances for σ2TA and σ
2
TF equal
to .28 (i.e., .18/.64=.28). In this case, ‘g’ accounts for approxi-
mately 64% of the observed score variance while A and F each
account for approximately 18% of the observed score variance
each (assuming that all of the covariance terms are 0.0). For a set
of contrasting values, we chose to simulate a condition inwhich
the variance due to gwas lower and the variance due to anxiety
and familiarity was relatively large. Thus, we set σg2=1.0, and
each of the variances for σ2TA and σ
2
TF equal to .50. In this case, ‘g’
accounts for approximately 50% of the observed score variance
while A and F each account for approximately 25% of the
observed score variance each (assuming that all of the
covariance terms are 0.0). Note, to minimize the complexity of
the results, we did not include conditions where σ2TA and σ
2
TF
differed fromeachother (i.e.,wedidnot cross these two factors).
2.3. Data generation
A total of 48,000 sampleswere generated,with 750 samples
(N=200 in each) generated in eachof the 64 conditions: 2 (rYa) ×
2 (rYf)×2 (rga)×2 (rgf)×2 (raf)×2(σ2TA and σ
2
TF). More speciﬁcally,
we started each condition by constructing a 6 X 6 correlation
matrix consisting of the following correlations: rYg, rYa, rYf, rga,
rgf, raf. The correlation rYg, representing the true CRV of general
mental ability, was set at .50 for all conditions. The other
correlations represent the ﬁrst ﬁve independent variables. To
derive the raw data for each sample, each of these correlation
matrices was subjected to a Cholesky decomposition 750 times
using the matrix facility of SPSS (SPSS, 1999). The Cholesky
decomposition option in the SPSS matrix facility is a procedure
that provides data for a speciﬁed number of simulated
participants consistent with a particular correlation matrix
(SPSS, 1999). Thus, for each of the 750 samples within each
condition, we generated scores for the criterion variable (Y), g,
anxiety (A), and test familiarity (F) for each of the 200 simulated
individuals. Each of these variables was distributed uniformly
with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. As noted, the A
and F variables were then multiplied by either .28 or .5
(depending on condition) to reduce their variance relative to
g. Thus, in the end, we had K=48,000 samples (750 samples ×
64 conditions) and a total N=9,600,000.
2.4. Dependent variable
The dependent variable was the average observed correla-
tion between the criterion scores and the observed ability test
score (X). To calculate the observed ability test scores, we
created a new variable, X, by summing each individual's g, A
and F scores. The correlation between X and Y was then
calculated for each sample. Thus, we had 48,000 observed
correlations (rXY).
3. Results
The means of the 750 CRV coefﬁcients computed within
each of the 64 conditions are presented in Table 1. Across all
Table 1
Average observed correlation between observed test score (X) and criterion
(Y)
When σg2=1.0, σTA
2= .28, and σTF
2= .28
rga raf rgf rYa=0.0 rYa=− .29
rYf=0.0 rYf=+.15 rYf=0.0 rYf=+.15
rga=0.0 raf=0.0 rgf=0.0 .463 .507 .386 .427
rgf=+.11 .454 .492 .372 .416
raf=− .27 rgf=0.0 .473 .513 .395 .437
rgf=+.11 .461 .501 .383 .421
rga=− .18 raf=0.0 rgf=0.0 .487 .528 .407 .444
rgf=+.11 .468 .509 .391 .437
raf=− .27 rgf=0.0 .498 .537 .407 .450
rgf=+.11 .483 .517 .399 .438
When σg2=1.0, σTA
2= .5, and σTF
2= .5
rga=0.0 raf=0.0 rgf=0.0 .406 .467 .290 .350
rgf=+.11 .393 .452 .280 .337
raf=− .27 rgf=0.0 .428 .491 .304 .368
rgf=+.11 .411 .473 .292 .353
rga=− .18 raf=0.0 rgf=0.0 .435 .498 .308 .373
rgf=+.11 .417 .480 .296 .360
raf=− .27 rgf=0.0 .460 .527 .325 .394
rgf=+.11 .439 .503 .311 .378
Note. The true correlation between g and Ywas set at ρ=.50. The subscripts are
as follows: ‘g’=general cognitive ability; ‘A’=test anxiety; ‘F’=test familiarity.
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64 conditions, the mean observed CRV coefﬁcient is .42
(S.D.= .07; range .280–.537). On average, the observed CRV
was 85% (S.D.=14%; range 56%–107%) of the rho value.
Again, recall that we eliminated error variance from the
simulation so that these correlations are equivalent to
being disattenuated for unreliability.
First, and perhaps most important, in only 6 of the 64
conditions did the mean observed CRV overestimate the true
relation between g and the criterion variable. In all other
conditions, the mean observed CRV was lesser than or equal to
the true correlation of ρ=.50. Inﬂated CRVs were only observed
in the scenarios where anxiety is unrelated to the criterion and
where familiarity is related to the criterion. In no other scenario
did the observed CRV overestimate the actual rho value. Recall
from the discussion above, we believe the number of real life
situations where test familiarity is related to criterion perfor-
mance is quite limited. Thus, these results indicate that, inmost
real life situations assuming reasonable values for all the other
parameters, contaminating factors such as anxiety and famil-
iaritywill not lead to upwardbiases of CRV. Said differently, bias
hypotheses that claim these factors produce falsely high CRV
appear to be inconsistent with our model.
Nonetheless, the results show that observed CRV can vary
widely, with values ranging from r= .280 to r= .537. Consider-
ing that we did not explicitly model random error, these
results clearly demonstrate that test anxiety and test famil-
iarity can potentially have a serious moderating effect on
observed CRVs. As our results show, the magnitude of this
effect depends on the speciﬁc values used for each of the
parameters in Eq. (9). Assumingwe used reasonable estimates
in this simulation, these results suggest that the observed CRV
of ability tests can be signiﬁcantly reduced in some situations,
while remaining largely intact in other situations. Said
differently, the simulations results conﬁrm that CRV can be
signiﬁcantly underestimated in some situations.
A couple of counter-intuitive ﬁndings are also apparent.
The results suggest that regardless of whether anxiety is
correlatedwith the criterionmeasure, the observed validity of
ability tests is higher (i.e., closer to the true correlation
between g and the criterion) to the extent that g and anxiety
are (negatively) correlated. In either the upper or lower
section of Table 1, consider the analogous observed correla-
tions between the conditions when anxiety is correlated with
g compared to when it is not. When g and anxiety are
correlated (i.e., the second and fourth quarters of the table),
the observed validity coefﬁcients (average r= .43) are con-
sistently higher than the analogous condition where g and
anxiety are uncorrelated (i.e., the rows in the ﬁrst and third
quarters of the tables; average r=.41). An explanation for
these results becomes evident through an inspection of
Eq. (9). Under conditions in which g and test anxiety are
negatively correlated, this negative covariance term reduces
the sum of the denominator.
Test familiarity, in contrast, had the opposite effect. In all
cases, increasing the correlation between g and test familiarity
decreased the CRV of the observed score, even when test
familiarity was positively correlated with the criterion. How-
ever, it should also be noted that the CRV increases to the extent
that test anxiety and test familiarity are negatively correlated.
A full evaluation of Table 1 suggests that effects of two
parameters are particularly important; speciﬁcally, the correla-
tion between anxiety and the criterion (rYa), and test familiarity
and the criterion (rYf). The twoeffects involving relationshipswith
thecriterionvariable areapparentbycomparingvaluesacross the
columns inTable 1. For example,when comparing the columns of
resultswhere rYa=0 to the columns of resultswhere rYa=− .29 (i.e.,
the two left side columns compared to the two right side
columns) noticeable differences can be seen. The values shown in
the left side columns are consistently larger than the correspond-
ing values (in the same row) in the columns on the right side of
the tables by an average of .10. Differences in CRVs are also
apparent when comparing values (on the same row) in the
columnswhere rYf=0 to the values in the columnswhere rYf=+.15.
On average the values in these columns differ by .06. By way of
contrast, the differences between CRVs are not as noticeable
when making comparisons across rows within a column (i.e.,
moving between conditions varying parameters other than those
parameters involving the relation between the criterion and
anxiety or familiarity). The average difference in CRVs between
conditions represented by rows is only .01. For example, the
average difference in CRVs when rga=0 and rga=− .18 is .01.
It is important to note that the speciﬁc values we obtained
are obviously a function of the speciﬁc values we used in the
simulation. It is possible to argue that other values could have
been used. Indeed, this is one of our main points; we strongly
encourage researchers to consider what are likely to be
reasonable values in their speciﬁc situation, and apply those
values to the formulas we have derived above. In this spirit, we
also conducted a series of sensitivity analyses to examine the
degree to which changes in some of the key estimates used
would impact the pattern and substantive nature of our results.
First, we ran sensitivity analyses using a higher rho (rho=.75
instead of the original .50). For this sensitivity analysis, we re-
ran 26 conditions chosen somewhat randomly, but ensuring to
cover the full range of conditions. Although the actual observed
CRVs are higher, the percentof rho reﬂected byobserved rxywas
basically the same. For many conditions, the percentages were
exactly the same. That is, changing thevalueof rhohadnoeffect
on the degree to which the observed rxy estimates rho. For the
others, the changes were small ﬂuctuations (small increases or
decreases of 3% or so). More importantly, the overall pattern of
results was the same; the conditions that lead to the lowest
observed CRV (relative to the other conditions) still yielded the
lowest and those that yielded the highest still yielded the
highest. Said differently, the substantive conclusions regarding
the impact of anxiety and familiarity were the same. (These
results are not presented but are available from theﬁrst author).
Second, we re-ran the simulation changing the amount of
variance in observed scores due to anxiety and familiarity. To
this end, we ran all the conditions where both A and F had
originally been set at .5 to be equal to g; that is, g, anxiety and
familiarity each contributed 33% of the variance to the
observed scores. Though an admittedly extreme case, the
effect was predictable. That is, by decreasing the variance due
to g, we essentially increased the variance in X due to anxiety
and familiarity. Not surprising, the percent of rho captured by
observed CRV decreased accordingly. However, the pattern of
results was again the same. The conditions that gave the
lowest observed CRV still gave the lowest; the ones that gave
the highest, still gave the highest. The generally constant
decrease in CRV led to fewer cases where CRV was over-
estimated, but the overall pattern of observed CRVs was the
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same as the results shown in Table 1. (A detailed presentation
of these additional analyses is available from the ﬁrst author).
4. Discussion
Recall the primary purpose of the current paper was to use
Classical Test Theory formulas to elucidate how test anxiety
and test familiarity inﬂuence observed scores on cognitive
ability tests, the variance in those scores across a sample of
test takers, and most importantly, the CRV of those scores.
With respect to the issue of CRV, our Eq. (9) shows how the
non-ability factors of test anxiety and test familiarity will
impact the observed correlation between observed ability test
scores and a criterion variable; in particular, this equation
reveals several additional terms that must be considered. The
subsequent simulation was presented to help elucidate the
implications of these additional parameters. Although the
speciﬁc pattern of results from the simulation is somewhat
complex, we believe they demonstrate several important
implications of Eq. (9).
First, according to our model, the contaminating factors of
test anxiety and test familiarity can have a signiﬁcant negative
impact on the observed CRV of cognitive ability tests. In fact,
in the simulation we found that the observed CRV coefﬁcient
between ability test scores and a criterion measure was
higher than the true CRV coefﬁcient only in the unlikely
scenarios where test-speciﬁc familiarity was correlated with
criterion performance. As such, it seems unlikely that the
observed relationships between cognitive ability test scores
and a criterion represent overestimates of the true relation-
ship between g and criterion performance.
Of course, ﬁnding that the CRV is degraded in most cases is
not unexpected; adding variables to a composite which is less
correlated with the criterion than the initial variable (g in this
case) will generally reduce the overall CRV. However, Eq. (9)
shows, and the simulation conﬁrms, that the degree of impact
of anxiety and familiarity on observed CRV coefﬁcients is
complex and highly variable. Although the average effect is a
reduction in the CRV, the results do show a large range of
possibilities including a situation (though likely rare) inwhich
the observed CRV is actually larger than that due to g alone.
This underscores a main point of this paper: a true under-
standing of the inﬂuence of test anxiety and test familiarity on
CRV coefﬁcients requires the careful consideration of a
number of factors as they exist in a speciﬁc situation. The
exact impact will depend on the precise association among a
number of parameters, the relative amount of change in those
parameters across situations, and on the nature of the
criterion measure itself. Hence, researchers need to consider
what the most likely or reasonable values are in their
situation and use the formulas to estimate the potential
impact on observed CRV. The purpose of the simulationwas to
give a sense of the degree to which various combinations
might inﬂuence CRV; it is not intended to be an exhaustive
explication of all possibilities.
Third, the results of the simulation of variance clearly
show that the most important determinants of the effect of
test anxiety and test familiarity on CRV are the relationships
between these factors and criterion scores. We believe this is a
critically important ﬁnding given that there has been very
little attention paid to these parameters. A vast majority of the
existing research, theorizing, and commentaries on the
impact of non-cognitive factors on the CRV of ability tests
has focused exclusively on the relationships between these
factors and scores on the predictor. Our results suggest that
much more attention needs to be paid to the relationships
between these factors and scores on the criterion variables. As
just indicated, it is possible that in speciﬁc circumstances the
inclusion of these non-ability factors might actually enhance
observed CRV. While we acknowledge these circumstances
are likely rare, the point should not be dismissed: Under-
standing how so-called “biasing” factors in cognitive ability
tests impact the validity and utility of tests requires serious
consideration of the criterion to be predicted.
4.1. Implications for future research
To conduct the simulation study, we needed to identify
reasonable estimates for the seven focal parameters in Eq. (9).
Although we believe we used the best available estimates, it
became obvious that there was little to no empirical evidence
regarding some of those parameters. We believe this potential
limitation of our simulation underscores a particularly
important implication of the current paper. Despite a
substantial literature on the issue of test bias, test anxiety,
and test familiarity, there are keygaps in our knowledgewhich
are preventing a comprehensive understanding of how and
when non-ability factors might negatively impact the use of
ability test scores. The derivation of a psychometricmodel (i.e.,
Eq. (9)) allowed us to identify all the pieces of information that
are needed. Thus, we call for researchers to explicitly state the
psychometric model underlying their hypotheses concerning
the effects of non-ability factors on ability test scores and their
CRV. Second, a clear implication is that more research is
needed. Speciﬁcally, we make a call for research that focuses
on estimating, in real world settings, the values of key
parameters identiﬁed in Eq. (9). Continued estimation of the
correlation between test anxiety and observed test scores
would appear to be of little value as multiple meta-analyses
(e.g., Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997; Hembree, 1988) have
provided good evidence for that particular parameter. Needed,
however, is research examining the relationships between
anxiety and the g-factor (as opposed to observed test scores),
the components of test familiarity and the g-factor, and in
particular, the relation between these non-ability constructs
and key criterion variables.
Second, we note that Eq. (9) can also be useful as a
psychometricmodel forunderstandingother test related issues,
such as the impact of anxiety reduction programs, retesting, or
test-skills training on the CRV of test scores. Eq. (9) makes it
clear that simply hypothesizing a mean decrease or increase in
test anxiety or test familiarity is insufﬁcient. Rather, to predict
the impact on CRV one needs to know how these activities
inﬂuence all of the parameters in Eq. (9). Take the issue of
retesting as an example. Existing arguments regarding the
nature of retest effects (i.e., a systematic increase in mean
scores) often cite a decrease in debilitating factors such as test
anxiety or increases in facilitating factors such as test familiarity
(e.g., Lievens, Buyse, & Sackett, 2005). Assuming for the
moment these arguments have merit, understanding and
predicting how retesting will impact test scores and their CRV
requires one to have knowledge of all of the parameters in
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Eq. (9) at both initial testing and retesting, or at least an idea of
how parameters will change from the initial test to the retest.
However, as noted previously, the current literature does not
provide sufﬁcient information to make all of these estimates
with any reasonable degree of certainty. Thus again, we believe
this demonstrates the utility of explicitly stating the psycho-
metric model underlying conceptual arguments. By doing so,
researchers can gain a better sense of what information is
needed to fully understand a phenomenon and canmakemore
precise estimates regarding the impact of interventions or
extraneous factors on CRV. In the current paper, we have used
Classical Test Theory as a foundation for our model. This is not
the only possible basis for such research. Indeed, we encourage
researchers to conduct similar work using other complemen-
tary frameworks such as latent trait models (e.g., factor analytic
frameworks, item-response theory). We believe future endea-
vors such as these would continue to strengthen and enhance
our theoretical understanding of how these various factors
exactly inﬂuence psychometric and consequential validity of
ability tests (Messick, 1989).
Finally, we would like acknowledge a number of concerns
raised by a reviewer regarding or models. First, it is important
to again emphasize that the statistical concept of “true score”
is not the same thing as the concept of a latent variable or a
psychological construct. As we noted above, from a technical
standpoint, “true score” is deﬁned as a composite of all
systematic sources of variance. Thus, true score can be deﬁned
as the mean score for an individual if he or she were to
complete the assessment across a large number of identical
testing situations (i.e., under the same testing conditions, in
the same physical and psychological state). Therefore, it is
important to note that in places where we make analogies
between true scores and latent variables, we are technically in
error and have obscured the distinction between these
concepts. Second, we acknowledge that Classical Test Theory
deﬁnes CRV as the correlation between observed test scores
(which is driven by shared true score variance). In our
discussion, we have used the concept of a true CRV (e.g., a rho
value) as reﬂecting the observable correlation among true
score components only. Again, this is blending of CTT and
latent variable frameworks which lead to some statements
that are not technically correct. We acknowledge that some
may ﬁnd the use of CTT in general, and making analogies
between CTT and latent variable frameworks, potentially
confusing. However, we believe that CTT is satisfactory for our
purpose which is to make salient the point that researchers
need to consider additional parameters in attempts to
understand how non-ability factors might inﬂuence test
scores and observed CRV.
4.2. Conclusions
The primary purpose of this paper was to articulate a
model that can be used to understand the likely impact of test
anxiety and test familiarity on the CRV of ability tests. Using
the history of differential psychology as a guide, we believe
that by (re)embracing general measurement theory and using
it as a foundation, research on the applied assessment of
individual differences and the attendant issue of bias due to
non-ability factors will be more scientiﬁcally proﬁtable. With
such a theory in hand, empirical researchers should be more
apt to develop a coherent body of research by systematically
investigating each parameter in Eq. (9). In doing so, we are
much more likely to achieve a fundamental understanding of
how these factors inﬂuence observed scores on cognitive
ability tests and their corresponding CRV.
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